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We report an experiment comparing sequential and simultaneous contributions to a public 
good in a quasi-linear two-person setting (Varian, Journal of Public Economics, 1994). Our 
findings support the theoretical argument that sequential contributions result in lower overall 
provision than simultaneous contributions. However, the distribution of contributions is not as 
predicted: late contributors are sometimes willing to punish early low contributors by 
contributing less than their best response. This induces early contributors to contribute more 
than they otherwise would. A consequence of this is that we fail to observe a predicted first 
mover advantage. 
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In an important theoretical contribution to the literature on the voluntary provision of 
public goods Varian (1994) shows that, under appropriate assumptions, a sequential contribution 
mechanism elicits lower contributions than a simultaneous contribution mechanism. One of the 
implications is that if a fundraiser for a public good wanted to maximize contributions and could 
choose between solicitation mechanisms he or she should avoid the sequential mechanism. Key 
to this result is the crowding-out of contributions: under sequential moves a first-mover enjoys a 
first-mover advantage by contributing zero, relying on other contributors to provide the public 
good on their own. Thus, if forced to use a sequential mechanism, the fundraiser should ensure 
that those who are willing to contribute the most on their own refrain from contributing first. In 
this paper we report a laboratory experiment designed to investigate Varian’s model. 
It is difficult to test Varian’s model using field data, but some natural and field experiments 
suggest that sequential mechanisms can be very effective, and, in contrast to the theoretical 
result, may be more effective than simultaneous mechanisms. For example, several studies have 
demonstrated the advantage to fundraisers of announcing past contributions. Silverman, et al. 
(1984) examine data from a 20-hour national telethon in which three different funding schemes 
were employed. Their results show that announcing the names of individuals pledging money 
and the amount of money pledged resulted in greater contributions than when they were not 
announced. In other words, information about what other people have contributed in the past is 
in itself sufficient to increase contributions. List and Lucking-Reiley (2002) conduct a field 
experiment in which they manipulate the initial contributions to a fundraising campaign. They 
find that increasing the initial contribution from 10% to 67% of the campaign goal produced a 
nearly six-fold increase in subsequent contributions. Frey and Meier (2004) show that 
contributions to two charitable funds at the University of Zurich are affected by the information 
about how many others donated in the past. In a similar vein, Croson and Shang (2008) conduct 
a field experiment in conjunction with the fundraising campaign of a public radio station and 
find that announcing contributions made by other donors in the past significantly affected 
contribution behavior. Martin and Randal (2008) find that manipulating the contents of an art 
gallery’s donation box (empty versus filled with money) affected patrons’ donation behavior. 
These studies suggest that initial contributions may crowd-in, rather than crowd-out, subsequent 
  2contributions. Closest to a comparison of sequential and simultaneous mechanisms is the field 
experiment of Soetevent (2005), who compares ‘closed bag’ and ‘open basket’ methods for 
Baptist church collections in the Netherlands. With traditional closed bag collections members of 
the congregation are contributing simultaneously in the sense that they do not know the decisions 
of other contributors at the time they make donations, whereas with open baskets they contribute 
sequentially in the sense that they do have information about earlier contributions when they 
make donations. Soetevent finds that offerings for charitable purposes external to the parish were 
significantly higher when open collection baskets were used. 
One possible explanation for divergent theoretical and empirical results is that the theory of 
voluntary contributions does not fully capture motives for giving.
1 A large body of evidence, 
much of it gathered in carefully controlled laboratory experiments, shows that many people are 
concerned with fairness and reciprocity (e.g. see Fehr and Gächter (2000)). In particular, in 
experiments on the private provision of public goods many people are found to be ‘conditionally 
cooperative’ in that they are willing to contribute if others do so, but not willing to contribute if 
others free-ride.
2 These concerns may cause people to have a stronger, not weaker, disposition to 
contribute in response to contributions by others. Indeed, recent theoretical papers have analyzed 
behavior when individuals exhibit social preferences, and show that contributions by a leader 
may crowd-in subsequent contributions. Romano and Yildirim (2001) demonstrate that if players 
get a ‘warm-glow’ from contributing it is possible that crowding-in may result, reversing 
Varian’s results. Huck and Rey-Biel (2006) study contributions to team output and show that 
when agents dislike effort differentials followers reciprocate high efforts by leaders, and 
sequential contributions may be more effective than simultaneous contributions. These empirical 
                                                 
1 Another possibility is that these results reflect asymmetric information about the value of the public good. In this 
case early contributions by informed contributors signal that the public good has a high value and this induces 
higher contributions from uninformed contributors. Thus high quality charities may prefer sequential to 
simultaneous mechanisms (see Vesterlund (2003), and Andreoni (2006)). For experimental evidence on 
contributions in asymmetric information settings see Potters, et al. (2005) and Potters, et al. (2007). Sequential 
contribution mechanisms may also be effective when there is a provision point that must be met for the public good 
to be consumed (see Andreoni (1998)). 
2 See, e.g., Guttman (1986); Andreoni (1995); Keser and van Winden (2000); Fischbacher, et al. (2001); Croson, et 
al. (2005); Croson (2007); Gächter (2007); Ashley, et al. (2008); Muller, et al. (2008); Fischbacher and Gächter 
(forthcoming). 
  3and theoretical results make it unclear whether Varian’s results will hold among agents 
exhibiting social preferences.  
Our experiment focuses on the simplest version of Varian’s model with two players, quasi-
linear returns from public/private good consumption, and complete information about returns 
from public/private good consumption. This differs from previous experimental work on 
voluntary contributions in three important respects. First, we use a setup more aligned with the 
theoretical literature, where conventional theory (i.e. ignoring social preferences) predicts 
crowding out, rather than the usual setup where predicted contributions are independent of 
others’ contributions. Second, we use a set up where the returns from the public good varies 
across players, whereas the usual setup studies symmetric games. Third, whereas the usual setup 
has participants make simultaneous contributions, we also study sequential contribution 
mechanisms.  
Most previous public goods experiments that have studied sequential contributions do so in 
a linear environment where players have dominant strategies to contribute nothing. Thus, neither 
crowding out nor crowding in are predicted, and predicted contributions are invariant to move 
structure. In fact there is substantial evidence of conditional cooperation in these experiments: 
players are willing to contribute if others do so as well. This suggests a degree of crowding in, 
but at the same time, there is, at best, weak evidence that sequential moves lead to higher 
contributions. Gächter and Renner (2003), using a standard public goods experimental 
framework, find high degrees of reciprocity but no significant differences between aggregate 
contributions when all players contribute simultaneously and when one player makes a leader 
contribution before the other players respond. Güth, et al. (2007) find that aggregate 
contributions are only marginally higher with a simple sequential contribution mechanism than 
with a simultaneous one, and Levati, et al. (2007) show that this small positive effect of 
sequential moves vanishes in a setting where players have heterogeneous endowments and 
incomplete information about the distribution of endowments. Potters, et al. (2007) also find a 
substantial degree of reciprocity in a leader-follower game with a Prisoner’s Dilemma structure, 
but they also find that total contributions do not differ significantly from those observed in a 
simultaneous move version of the game. Previous experiments that have used non-linear returns 
from private and/or public goods have not compared alternative move structures (e.g. Keser 
  4(1996); Sefton and Steinberg (1996); Isaac and Walker (1998); Falkinger, et al. (2000); Willinger 
and Ziegelmeyer (2001); for a review, see Laury and Holt (2008)).
3 
Our experiment studies two cases, corresponding to different degrees of asymmetry in 
preferences. In one parameterization the returns from the public good do not vary much across 
players, and under sequential moves the first-mover is predicted to contribute zero, leaving the 
second-mover to provide the public good. Aggregate contributions are predicted to be lowest 
(and lower than under the simultaneous mechanism) in the sequential mechanism when the 
person with highest returns moves first. Consistent with equilibrium predictions, we find that 
aggregate contributions are indeed lowest when the person with highest returns moves first. 
However, the extreme prediction that the first-mover free-rides completely off the second-mover 
is not supported. We find that second-movers are sometimes willing to punish first-movers who 
contribute low amounts by contributing less than their best response, and this induces first-
movers to contribute higher amounts. A consequence of this is that we do not observe a predicted 
first mover advantage. 
We also study a second parameterization where one player gets much lower returns from 
the public good than the other. In this case the model yields a move-order invariance prediction: 
regardless of the order of moves the person with lowest returns contributes nothing, and all 
contributions are made by the person with highest returns. We find, again consistent with 
equilibrium predictions, that aggregate contributions are invariant to move structure. Again, 
however, individual contributions are not as predicted and we find evidence of punishment of 
low first-mover contributions. In this parameterization we observe an unpredicted first mover 
disadvantage. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next Section we briefly review 
Varian’s model and the main hypotheses our experiment is designed to test. In Section 3 we 
describe our experiment and in Section 4 report on the results. Section 5 concludes. 
                                                 
3 Another strand of the literature studies step-level public good settings where, in general, there are multiple 
equilibria and sequential moves can assist coordination on more efficient equilibria. Experiments have shown that 
sequential contribution mechanisms outperform simultaneous mechanisms in these settings. For example, Erev and 
Rapoport (1990) and Coats, et al. (2009) find that under a sequential contribution mechanism the rate of success in 
the provision of the public good is higher than under simultaneous moves. 
  52. Varian’s (1994) model of sequential contributions to a public good 
The simplest version of Varian’s model is based on a simple quasi-linear setting with two 
players, and this is the setting used in our experiment.
4 Varian allows preferences over the public 
good (‘tastes’) to differ between the two players and distinguishes between ‘the player who likes 
the public good most’ and ‘the player who likes the public good least’. In our experiment the 
player who likes the public good most in this sense is also the player who enjoys a higher return 
from the public good for any level of provision. We will therefore refer to her as the ‘HIGH’ 
player. We refer to the player who likes the public good least as the ‘LOW’ player. 
Player i, i ∈ {HIGH, LOW}, is endowed with wealth wi and contributes an amount 0 ≤ gi ≤ 
wi to a public good. The remainder is allocated to private good consumption. The total amount of 
the public good provided is G = gHIGH + gLOW. Player i’s payoff is given by:  
πi = wi – gi + fi(G) 
where individual i’s return from the public good, fi(G), is increasing and strictly concave. 
If the other agent contributes zero, player i’s best response is her ‘stand-alone contribution’ 
ĝi. Varian assumes wi > ĝi so that the first order condition for an interior optimum is satisfied: 
f ′i(ĝi) = 1. 
If player j contributes gj > ĝi then i’s marginal return from contributing gi is f ′i(gj + gi) – 1 
< 0. Thus i’s best response is gi = 0. If player j contributes gj ≤ ĝi, then i’s best response satisfies: 
f ′i(gi + gj) = 1. 
Comparing this with the first-order condition for an interior optimum we have:  
f ′i (gi + gj) = f ′i (ĝi) 
or 
gi = ĝi – gj. 
 Thus, i’s best response function is: 
gi = max{ĝi – gj, 0}. 
                                                 
4 Varian (1994) also shows that his results are more general than this. For example, contributions are weakly higher 
under simultaneous contributions if the public and private goods are normal and the utilities are common 
knowledge.  
  6Figure 1 shows the best response functions. Note that the best response functions feature 
one-for-one crowding out: if a player increases her contribution by one unit, the other player’s 
best response decreases by one unit (as long as her contribution is non-zero). 
Figure 1. Best-response functions 






With simultaneous moves, the unique Nash Equilibrium is gHIGH = ĝHIGH, gLOW = 0. Thus the 
LOW player contributes zero and the HIGH player makes her stand-alone contribution.  
Next, suppose the LOW player moves first. In a subgame perfect equilibrium the 
second-mover’s strategy is given by her best response function: gHIGH = max{ĝHIGH – gLOW, 0}. 
The LOW player’s subgame perfect equilibrium strategy results in her most preferred point 
on the HIGH player’s best response function. Suppose gLOW > ĝHIGH so that the HIGH player 
then contributes zero. The LOW player can reduce gLOW so that the HIGH player still 
contributes zero, but the LOW player moves closer to her stand-alone contribution (which is 
her optimal contribution given that gHIGH = 0). Thus, the LOW player’s payoff increases as 
she moves down the vertical part of the HIGH player’s best response function. Now suppose 
that 0 < gLOW ≤ ĝHIGH so that the HIGH player responds by ensuring that G = ĝHIGH. The LOW 
player can reduce her first-mover contribution and the HIGH player will compensate by 
increasing her second-mover contribution so that overall provision remains at G = ĝHIGH. Thus 
the LOW player’s payoff continues to increase as she moves down the HIGH player’s best 
response function. Clearly, her most preferred point is where gLOW = 0 and the HIGH player 
responds by choosing gHIGH = ĝHIGH. Thus, when the LOW player moves first she contributes 
  7zero, free-riding off the second mover’s stand-alone contribution. This outcome is the same 
as with simultaneous moves.  
If the HIGH player moves first she could also commit to contributing zero and rely on 
the L
s payoff as a function of her contribution for each of 
the tw
OW player to contribute ĝLOW, giving her a payoff of wHIGH + fHIGH(ĝLOW). Also, just as 
before, if she were to contribute a small amount the LOW player would reduce her 
contribution to the public good so that total provision remains at ĝLOW. Thus the HIGH 
player’s payoff would decrease, as she would enjoy a lower level of private good 
consumption and the same level of public good consumption. If the HIGH player contributes 
more than ĝLOW the LOW player will contribute zero and the HIGH player’s payoff will be 
wHIGH – gHIGH + fHIGH(gHIGH). In this range her payoff is maximized by her stand-alone 
contribution, ĝHIGH, leading to a payoff of wHIGH – ĝHIGH + fHIGH(ĝHIGH). The HIGH player’s 
optimal first-mover contribution depends on the comparison between her payoff when she 
contributes zero, wHIGH + fHIGH(ĝLOW), and her payoff when she makes her stand-alone 
contribution, wHIGH – ĝHIGH + fHIGH(ĝHIGH). 
Figure 2 displays the HIGH player’
o following cases. In case (a), with fHIGH(ĝHIGH) – fHIGH(ĝLOW) > ĝHIGH, the subgame perfect 
equilibrium is for the HIGH player to choose gHIGH = ĝHIGH and the LOW player responds with 
gLOW = 0. Again, the outcome is the same as with simultaneous moves. However, in case (b) 
where fHIGH(ĝHIGH) – fHIGH(ĝLOW) < ĝHIGH, the subgame perfect equilibrium is for the HIGH player 
to choose gHIGH = 0 and the LOW player responds with gLOW = ĝLOW. Here, since ĝLOW < ĝHIGH 
public good provision is lower than with simultaneous moves. Note that if the players have 
similar tastes for the public good, ĝHIGH will be similar to ĝLOW and so fHIGH(ĝHIGH) – fHIGH(ĝLOW) 
will be close to zero, and condition (b) will be met. Thus when tastes are not too different and 
the HIGH player moves first, contributions are lower than with simultaneous moves. 
  8Figure 2. The HIGH player’s payoff as a function of her first-mover contribution 
 
In summary, Varian’s model provides a number of testable predictions. Most generally, 
HYPOTHESIS 1. Aggregate contributions are (weakly) higher under a simultaneous 
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wHIGH + fHIGH (ĝ ) LOW
wHIGH – ĝLOW + fHIGH (ĝLOW)
(a) fHIGH (ĝHIGH) –  fHIGH (ĝLOW) > ĝHIGH
wHIGH + fHIGH (ĝLOW)
wHIGH – ĝHIGH + fHIGH (ĝHIGH)
wHIGH – ĝLOW + fHIGH (ĝLOW)
(b) fHIGH (ĝHIGH) –  fHIGH (ĝLOW) < ĝHIGH
  9HYPOTHESIS 1a. If tastes are sufficiently different aggregate contributions are invariant to the 
move structure. 
HYPOTHESIS 1b. If tastes are not too different aggregate contributions under a simultaneous 
contribution mechanism are i) the same as when the LOW player moves first, and ii) higher than 
when the HIGH player contributes first. 
The model provides parallel predictions for individual contributions: 
HYPOTHESIS 2a. If tastes are sufficiently different individual contributions are invariant to the 
move structure. 
HYPOTHESIS 2b. If tastes are not too different individual contributions under a simultaneous 
contribution mechanism are the same as when the LOW player moves first. When the HIGH 
player contributes first she reduces her contribution and the LOW player increases her 
contribution. 
The invariance result in HYPOTHESIS 2a implies that payoffs are also invariant to move 
structure. Thus: 
HYPOTHESIS 3a. If tastes are sufficiently different individual payoffs are invariant to move 
structure. 
However, when tastes are not too different payoffs do depend on move structure. 
HYPOTHESIS 2b stems from the first-mover’s ability to commit to a contribution and the one-
for-one crowding out of contributions. If the HIGH player moves first, rather than make her 
stand-alone contribution she may prefer to contribute nothing because she knows the LOW 
player  (who likes the public good least, but not too much less) will replace most of her 
contributions toward the public good. Although less of the public good is provided than under 
other move orderings, this way the HIGH player avoids the cost of contributing. Thus, in the 
case where tastes are not too different the first-mover enjoys a first-mover advantage and at the 
same time the second-mover suffers a second-mover disadvantage: 
HYPOTHESIS 3b. If tastes are not too different each player prefers being first- to second-mover.  
In our experiment subjects are paid according to their contributions, where earnings 
functions are based on the payoff functions of Varian’s model. Thus, these predictions also apply 
to our experimental environment, under the assumption that it is common knowledge that 
  10subjects maximize own-earnings. Given the evidence on the importance of social preferences, 
and in particular of conditional cooperation in public goods experiments, it is not so clear that 
experimental evidence will support the hypotheses outlined above. Will first-mover contributions 
really crowd out second-mover contributions? Is it perhaps more likely that, as in previous linear 
public good experiments, second-movers will contribute more after the first mover contributes? 
And, if the first-mover attempts to exploit her theoretical first-mover advantage by committing to 
contributing zero, will second-movers really contribute their private optimum, irrespective of the 
fact that by doing so they are helping the free-rider? Is it perhaps more likely that, as in 
ultimatum game experiments when responders are confronted with a low offer, second-movers 
will eschew their private interests in order to resist unfair outcomes?  
3. Experimental design and methods 
3.1 The experimental game 
Our experiment is based on the following two-player game. Each player is endowed with 
17 tokens, and must decide how many to place in a Private Account and how many to place in a 
Shared Account. For each token a player places in the Private Account that player receives 50 
points. For each token placed in the Shared Account both players receive an additional amount of 
points, which differ across players and across treatments as explained further below. The total 
earnings from the game are the sum of the earnings from the Private Account and the Shared 
Account. As already discussed in the previous section, the earnings functions imply that the 
HIGH player enjoys a higher return from the public good than the LOW player.
5 The earnings 
are derived from a quadratic utility function of the form: 
( ) ( ) ( )
2 68 ) 17 ( 50 j i j i i i i g g g g t g + − + ⋅ + − ⋅ = π  
where   represent the contribution decisions of player   and  { 17 ,..., 1 , 0 , ∈ j i g g } i j , for 
{ } , i j∈ , HIGH LOW  and j i ≠ , and where  1.32 HIGH t =  and  .   0 HIGH LOW tt >>
                                                 
5 During the experiment we never used the labels ‘HIGH’ and ‘LOW’ when referring to the two types of player, but 
instead used the labels ‘RED’ and ‘BLUE’. See the experimental instructions, reproduced in Appendix A, for further 
details. 
  11Our treatment variables are the parameter   and the order in which players make their 
decisions. In our three ‘T78’ treatments we have 
LOW t
0.78 LOW t =  and the public good generates low 
returns for the LOW player, while in three ‘T89’ treatments we set   and the returns 
for the LOW player are higher.
0.89 LOW t =
6 For each parameterization we examine treatments where the 
players play the game simultaneously (‘SIM’), where the HIGH player moves first (‘HIGH’), 
and where the LOW player moves first (‘LOW’). Our six experimental treatments are 
summarized in Table 1.  
Table 1. Overview of treatments 
Treatment  Order of Moves  LOW t  
Subgame Perfect Equilibrium 
Contributions Payoffs 
{HIGH, LOW} {HIGH, LOW}
SIM-T78  Simultaneous  0.78  {15, 0}  {1150, 1470} 
LOW-T78  LOW moves first  0.78  {15, 0}  {1150, 1470} 
HIGH-T78  HIGH moves first  0.78  {15, 0}  {1150, 1470} 
SIM-T89  Simultaneous  0.89  {15, 0}  {1150, 1555} 
LOW-T89  LOW moves first  0.89  {15, 0}  {1150, 1555} 
HIGH-T89  HIGH moves first  0.89  {0, 6}  {1340, 890} 
With these parameters we study both cases discussed in the previous section. In the three 
T78 treatments the equilibrium involves HIGH contributing 15 tokens and LOW contributing 0 
tokens, regardless of move ordering. LOW’s stand-alone contribution is so low that HIGH 
prefers to supply her own stand-alone contribution even if she is the first-mover. Thus, total 
contributions, the distribution of contributions and earnings are predicted to be invariant to the 
move order. In the T89 treatments predictions about contributions and earnings depend on the 
move order. In SIM-T89 and in LOW-T89 the equilibrium involves HIGH contributing 15 
tokens and LOW contributing 0 tokens. However, if HIGH moves first she enjoys a first-mover 
                                                 
6 In our experiment earnings were rounded to a multiple of 5 points and then presented to subjects in an Earnings 
Table, reproduced in Appendices B and C. The rounding preserves the one-for-one crowding out feature of the game 
as well as the key predictions outlined in the previous section. 
  12advantage by contributing 0 tokens and letting LOW contribute 6 tokens. This final treatment, 
HIGH-T89, involves a different equilibrium outcome from the other five and illustrates a case 
where sequential moves yield lower overall contributions than simultaneous moves. 
3.2 Procedures 
The experiment was conducted at the University of Nottingham using subjects recruited 
from a university-wide pool of students who had previously indicated their willingness to be paid 
volunteers in decision-making experiments.
7 Twelve sessions were conducted (two sessions for 
each treatment) with 16 participants per session. No subject took part in more than one session 
and so 192 subjects participated in total. The average age was 20.2 years and 52% were female. All 
sessions used an identical protocol. Upon arrival, subjects were welcomed and randomly seated 
at visually separated computer terminals. Subjects were then given a written set of instructions 
that the experimenter read aloud. The instructions included a set of control questions about how 
choices translated into earnings. Subjects had to answer all the questions correctly before the 
experiment could continue. 
The decision-making phase of the session consisted of 15 rounds of the game described 
above, where in each round subjects were randomly matched with another participant. Neither 
during nor after the experiment were subjects informed about the identity of the other people in 
the room they were matched with. The matching procedure worked as follows. At the beginning 
of each session the participants were randomly allocated to one of two eight-person matching 
groups. The computer then randomly allocated the role of HIGH to four subjects and the role of 
LOW to the other four subjects in each matching group. Subjects were informed of their role at 
the beginning of the first round and kept this role throughout the 15 rounds. At the beginning of 
each round the computer randomly formed pairs consisting of one HIGH and one LOW 
participant within each matching group. To ensure comparability among sessions and treatments, 
we randomly formed pairings within each matching group prior to the first session and used the 
same pairings for all sessions.
8 Because no information passed across the two matching groups, 
                                                 
7 Subjects were recruited through the online recruitment system ORSEE (Greiner (2004)). The experiment was 
programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher (2007)).  
8 Subjects were informed that they would be randomly matched with another person in the room in each round (see 
Appendix A), although the details of the matching procedure were not specified. 
  13we treat data from each matching group as independent. Thus our design generates two 
independent observations for each session, or four independent observations per treatment. 
Repetition of the task was used because we expected that subjects might learn from experience. 
However, our desire to test predictions based on a one-shot model led us to use the random re-
matching design in order to reduce repeated game effects. 
Subjects were paid based on their choices in one randomly-determined round. At the end of 
round fifteen a poker chip was drawn from a bag containing chips numbered from 1 to 15. The 
number on the chip determined the round that was used for determining all participants’ cash 
earnings. At the end of the experiment subjects were asked to complete a short questionnaire 
asking for basic demographic information and were then privately paid according to their point 
earnings in the round which had been randomly selected at the end of round fifteen. Point 
earnings were converted into British Pounds at a rate of £0.01 per point. Subject earnings ranged 
from £8.50 to £17.50, averaging £12.69 (at the time of the experiment £1 ≈ $1.61), and sessions 
lasted about 75 minutes on average. 
4. Experimental results 
4.1 Aggregate contributions 
We start our analysis by looking at aggregate contributions to the public good made by 
pairs of subjects across treatments. Table 2 shows aggregate contribution averages and standard 
deviations in our six treatments. In line with theoretical predictions, aggregate contributions are 
lowest in HIGH-T89 – averaging 10.2 across the whole 15 rounds, somewhat higher than the 
predicted 6 tokens – while contributions are about 14 tokens in the other treatments (except in 
LOW-T89 where contributions seem somewhat lower than predicted).  
In all treatments contributions are higher in the first five rounds and then stabilize to a 
lower level from round 6 onwards. This pattern is clear in Figure 3, which shows the 
development of average aggregate contributions across the 15 rounds of the experiment. 
Equilibrium aggregate contributions are shown by dashed lines. In the T78 treatments 
equilibrium aggregate contributions are invariant to move structure, and the three treatments are 
in fact difficult to distinguish and appear to track quite well the prediction (dark dash line at 15 
tokens). In the T89 treatments equilibrium aggregate contributions are predicted to vary with the 
  14move order, contributions being lower in HIGH-T89 (light dash line at 6 tokens) than in the 
other two treatments (dark dash line at 15 tokens). Here, consistent with the comparative static 
predictions, contributions are lower in HIGH-T89 than in the other two treatments, though the 
magnitude of the difference is smaller than predicted. 
Table 2. Aggregate contributions
* 
Treatment Predicted  Overall  Round 
1 to 5  6 to 10  11 to 15 






















































* The table shows aggregate contribution per game, with standard deviations in parentheses. 
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*Equilibrium aggregate contributions are shown by dashed lines. HIGH-T89 light dash, all other 
treatments dark dash. 
  15Figure 4 shows the distribution of aggregate contributions in each treatment. Note that the 
public good is provided at its equilibrium level more often in the sequential than in the 
simultaneous treatments. In each of the sequential treatments the modal aggregate contribution 
level corresponds with the equilibrium contribution level, while this does not occur in either of 
the simultaneous treatments, where contributions are instead more dispersed. A second 
noteworthy feature of Figure 4 is that, among the sequential treatments, we observe a larger 
fraction of aggregate contributions at the equilibrium level in the T78 treatments, where about 
45% of the aggregate contributions are at the equilibrium, than in the T89 treatments, where less 
than 30% of the observed aggregate contributions are at the equilibrium. 
Figure 4. Distributions of aggregate contributions by treatment
* 
 
* Based on all 240 games in each treatment. Equilibrium aggregate contributions are marked with a star. 
  16As predicted, contributions in HIGH-T89 are significantly different from the other T89 
treatments (HIGH-T89 vs. LOW-T89: p = 0.029; HIGH-T89 vs. SIM-T89: p = 0.029).
9 It is 
evident from Figures 3 and 4 that this is because contributions are lower in HIGH-T89. The other 
two T89 treatments do not differ significantly from one another (p = 0.457), and nor are there 
any significant differences in aggregate contributions between the T78 treatments (p > 0.686 in 
all pair-wise comparisons). Thus, our data supports HYPOTHESES 1a and 1b.  
RESULT 1 – In line with theoretical predictions, aggregate contributions are (weakly) 
higher under a simultaneous contribution mechanism compared to a sequential 
contribution mechanism (HYPOTHESIS 1). As predicted, aggregate contributions are 
invariant to the move structure in the T78 treatments (HYPOTHESIS 1a). Also as 
predicted, aggregate contributions depend on the move structure in the T89 treatments: 
contributions are significantly lower when the HIGH player is the first contributor than 
under a simultaneous contribution mechanism or under a contribution mechanism 
where HIGH is the second contributor (HYPOTHESIS 1b). 
4.2 Contributions by type of player 
We next turn to an analysis of average contribution decisions by type of player, i.e. we 
look at the distribution of contributions across HIGH and LOW subjects. Table 3 presents HIGH 
and LOW contribution averages and standard deviations across the six treatments, and Figure 5 
shows how these averages develop across rounds.  
An evident feature of Table 3 and Figure 5 is that HIGH contributes more than LOW in all 
treatments. In five of six cases this is consistent with theoretical predictions. The exception is 
HIGH-T89, where HIGH is predicted to contribute zero and LOW is predicted to contribute six 
tokens (light dash lines in lower panel of Figure 5), but in fact HIGH contributes an average of 
7.71 tokens and LOW contributes 2.49 tokens. In the other treatments HIGH is predicted to 
contribute 15 tokens and LOW is predicted to contribute 0 tokens (dark dash lines in Figure 5). 
Although HIGH contributes more than LOW as predicted, contribution levels differ (sometimes 
                                                 
9 All p-values are based on two-sided randomization tests applied to 4 independent observations per treatment. Moir 
(1998) describes the randomization test and discusses its advantages in the analysis of laboratory generated 
economic data based on small sample sizes. 
  17substantially) from the point predictions made by theory: HIGH contributes less than predicted 
and LOW contributes more than predicted.  
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* The table shows contribution per game with standard deviations in parentheses. 
Table 3 and Figure 5 also suggest that HIGH and LOW contributions tend to differ across 
the T78 treatments. LOW and HIGH contributions appear closest to theoretical point predictions 
in the treatment HIGH-T78 and deviate most markedly in LOW-T78. In fact, for both types of 
player, contributions in HIGH-T78 are significantly different from LOW-T78 (HIGH players: p 
= 0.057; LOW players: p = 0.029). This finding is not consistent with theoretical predictions 
because HIGH and LOW contributions should be invariant to the move structure in the T78 
treatments (HYPOTHESIS 2a). 
Our data from the T89 treatments provide mixed evidence concerning HYPOTHESIS 2b. 
Consistent with theoretical predictions, HIGH contributions in HIGH-T89 differ significantly 
from the other T89 treatments at the 10% level (HIGH-T89 vs. LOW-T89: p = 0.086; HIGH-
T89 vs. SIM-T89: p = 0.057). The reason is that HIGH subjects reduce their contributions in 
HIGH-T89 (although contributions are well above the theoretically predicted level of zero, see 
Figure 5). On the other hand, contrary to theoretical predictions, LOW contributions in HIGH-
  18T89 are not significantly different from the other T89 treatments (HIGH-T89 vs. LOW-T89: p 
= 0.171; HIGH-T89 vs. SIM-T89: p = 0.114). In fact, while theory predicts that LOW will 
contribute more in HIGH-T89 than in the other T89 treatments, LOW subjects actually 
contribute less. 
Figure 5. HIGH and LOW contributions across rounds
* 
 
*Equilibrium contributions are shown by dashed lines. HIGH-T89 light dash, all other 
treatments dark dash. 
  19Our second result on the distribution of contributions across types of player is therefore 
somewhat inconsistent with theoretical predictions: 
RESULT 2: Inconsistent with HYPOTHESIS 2a LOW and HIGH contributions are not 
invariant to the move structure in the T78 treatments. In the T89 treatments 
HYPOTHESIS 2b suggests HIGH will reduce her contribution and LOW will increase 
her contribution when HIGH moves first. Although HIGH does reduce her contribution 
when she moves first, LOW fails to increase her contribution significantly. 
4.3 First-mover advantage 
In the T78 treatments players’ stand-alone contributions to the public good are so different 
that, in theory, HIGH provides the public good by herself irrespective of the move structure. 
Hence, both HIGH and LOW are indifferent between moving first or moving second 
(HYPOTHESIS 3a). By contrast, in theory the move structure matters in the T89 treatments. 
Both players would prefer to move first, commit to zero initial contributions, and force the 
second-mover to provide the public good. This results in a first-mover advantage and a second-
mover disadvantage in the T89 treatments (HYPOTHESIS 3b).  
Our data cannot confirm either hypothesis. Table 4 shows average earnings made by HIGH 
and LOW subjects in the sequential treatments. In the T78 treatments there is a clear first-mover 
disadvantage in our data: HIGH subjects are worse off in HIGH-T78, where they move first, than 
in LOW-T78, where they move second, and vice versa for LOW subjects. The differences in 
earnings between the two T78 treatments are significant for both types of player (p = 0.029 in 
both comparisons).
10  
Moving to HYPOTHESIS 3b, HIGH subjects should be better off in HIGH-T89 (i.e. where 
they are the first-mover) than in LOW-T89 (i.e. where they are the second-mover), and vice versa 
for LOW subjects. Our data show that HIGH average earnings are actually lower when they move 
                                                 
10 The result holds for LOW even in the last 5 rounds of the experiment (p = 0.029). HIGH earnings are still higher 
in LOW-T78 than in HIGH-T78 in the last 5 rounds (1232 vs. 1151), but the difference is just insignificant (p = 
0.114). 
  20first than when they move second, and the difference is significant at the 10% level (p = 0.086). 
LOW earnings do not differ significantly across the sequential T89 treatments (p = 0.286).
11 
Table 4. Earnings by type of player
 * 
Treatment 
HIGH   LOW  
Predicted Observed Predicted Observed 
























* The table shows average earnings, in points, per game, based on all rounds of 
data. Standard deviations in parentheses. 
RESULT 3: Contrary to theoretical predictions, we observe a first-mover disadvantage 
in the T78 treatments (where the distribution of earnings should be invariant to the move 
structure), and we fail to observe a first-mover advantage in the T89 treatments (where it 
should be observed). Thus, our data are inconsistent with HYPOTHESES 3a and 3b. 
4.4 Individual behavior 
While our data generally support Varian’s model predictions for aggregate contributions, 
we find much less evidence in support of the parallel theoretical predictions for individual 
contributions and earnings. In this sub-section we examine in more detail the divergences 
between theoretically predicted and observed behavior, focusing on the sequential treatments. 
We start our analysis of individual behavior by categorizing second-mover behavior relative to 
best responses in each of the four sequential treatments (Table 5).  
                                                 
11 We fail to observe a first-mover advantage for HIGH even in the last 5 rounds of the experiment (p = 0.314). We 
do instead have evidence for a first-mover advantage for LOW. LOW earnings are higher in LOW-T89 (1289) than 
in HIGH-T89 (1172) in the last 5 rounds and the difference is significant (p = 0.029). 
  21Table 5. Second-mover contributions relative to best-response 
Treatment 
% of second-movers’ contributions 
equal to the 
best-response 
lower than the 
best-response 
higher than the 
best-response 
  all rounds (N = 240 per treatment) 
LOW-T78  41   32  27  
HIGH-T78  73 - 27 
LOW-T89  25   49   26 
HIGH-T89  60   9   31 
  last 5 rounds only (N = 80 per treatment) 
LOW-T78 51  34  15 
HIGH-T78  81 - 19 
LOW-T89 25  63  12 
HIGH-T89 60  20  20 
A large fraction of second-mover’s contributions are not a best response to the first-
mover’s contribution decision. The treatment where second-movers’ decisions are most in line 
with their best-response is HIGH-T78, and this is also the treatment that exhibits by far the 
greatest degree of conformance with equilibrium point predictions, as discussed above (see, e.g., 
Table 3).
12 This treatment also differs from the other sequential treatments in that theory predicts 
only the first-mover will contribute.
13 
                                                 
12 Note also that lower-than-best response to first-mover decisions can occur very limitedly in HIGH-T78, as 
second-movers’ best-response function is flat at zero for most of first-mover’s contributions. 
13 Another structural feature of the HIGH-T78 treatment that distinguishes it from the other sequential treatments is 
that the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome is also the unique Nash equilibrium outcome, whereas in the other 
treatments there are (imperfect) Nash equilibria where aggregate contributions are the same as in the subgame 
perfect equilibrium, but the first mover makes positive contributions. For example, a second-mover might threaten 
to contribute 0 tokens if the first-mover contributes less than a threshold value   and to best-respond if and only if  g
. Given this threat the first-mover may find it optimal to choose  .  g g ≥ g
  22Pooling across the other three sequential treatments we note that second-movers 
contributed below their best response in 30% of games and above in 28% of games. However, in 
all three treatments we observe that contributions lower than the best-response persist and 
actually  grow over time, while contributions higher than the best-response appear to be a 
phenomenon due (at least in part) to subjects’ inexperience with the experimental setting and 
tend to decrease (roughly by 50%) across rounds. Focusing on the last five rounds, deviations 
from best-responses are just as frequent as in earlier rounds, but they are more likely to be 
deviations below the best-response function. 
When second-movers contribute less than their best-response, this disproportionately 
occurs in reaction to very low initial contributions. Figure 6 shows optimal and empirical 
second-mover responses to first-mover contributions in the three treatments where we observe 
deviations below the best-response function. About 60% of the deviations below the best-
response function occur when a first-mover contributes between 0 and 2 tokens, while we cannot 
distinguish a similar pattern for deviations above the best-response function, as they do not seem 
to be clustered at any specific interval of the first-mover’s contributions.
14  
In general, second-mover behavior in these three treatments generates observed 
response functions that are flatter than predicted by theory. Table 6 reports a Tobit analysis 
of second movers’ contributions on first movers’ initial contribution decision and confirms 
this observation. The observed slope of second-movers’ response function, although 
negative, is much less than the predicted value of -1. Indeed, the coefficient is not significant 
in the treatments where LOW moves first. The intercept coefficient is also lower than 
predicted (predicted β0 = 15 for the LOW-T78 and LOW-T89 and β0 = 6 for the HIGH-T89 
treatments). 
 
                                                 
14 26% of the deviations above the best-response occur when the first-mover contributes between 0 and 2 tokens, 
22% when the first-mover contributes between 3 and 5 tokens, 19% when the first-mover contributes between 6 and 
8 tokens, 17% when the first-mover contributes between 9 and 11 tokens and 16% when the first-mover contributes 
12 tokens or more. 
  23Figure 6. Average responses by second-movers to the first-mover’s contributions. 
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(31) (7) (8) (15) (12) (34) (11) (7) (11) (12) (15) (14) (7) (3) (1) (35) (1) (16)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
First-mover's contribution
Observed average contribution, all rounds
Predicted best-response function
HIGH T89
(18) (3) (2) (7) (7) (12) (6) (0) (2) (1) (0) (4) (0) (0) (0) (11) (1) (6)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
First-mover's contribution
Observed average contribution, last 5 rounds
Predicted best-response function
HIGH T89
   
* Numbers below the horizontal axes report the observed frequency of each contribution decision by 
first-movers. 
  24Table 6. Empirical response functions: Tobit regressions 
 
Estimated equation: 
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Robust standard errors in parentheses adjusted for intra-group correlation (matching-
groups are used as independent clustering units).  
*  ; 
**  ; 
***  10 . 05 . ≤ ≤ p 05 . 01 . < ≤ p 01 . < p . 
Overall, these observations suggest that some second-movers adopt a punishment 
strategy in these treatments: they punish first-movers for excessively low contributions by 
systematically lowering their contribution-responses below the best-response line.
15 Moreover, 
this aspect of second-mover behavior persists and is just as clearly observed in the last five 
rounds. This aspect of our data is reminiscent of Huck, et al. (2001) ‘punishment-for-
exploitation’ finding from Stackelberg quantity choice duopoly games. They find that when first-
movers attempt to exploit their first-mover advantage by committing to a high quantity, second-
movers produce more than their best response. Relative to the best response this is, of course, 
costly for the second-mover. Relative to the best response it is also detrimental to first movers 
since it results in a higher aggregate quantity and hence a lower price. More generally, this aspect 
of our data is reminiscent of punishment of free-riders in linear public goods games (for a survey 
of results see Gächter and Herrmann (2009)). 
It is interesting to consider the implications of second-mover behavior for the T89 
treatments. In LOW-T89 this punishment resulted in lower aggregate contributions than 
                                                 
15 Note that punishment is relatively cheap for second-movers but can be quite costly to first-movers. For example, 
in the treatment LOW-T89 if HIGH second-movers reacted to a zero-contribution by LOW by contributing nothing 
rather than the best-response of 15 tokens, they would reduce their own earnings by 300 points but decrease LOW 
earnings by 705 points. 
  25predicted. However, the effect is not strong enough to result in a very sharp decline in aggregate 
contributions relative to predictions, particularly since LOW gave, on average, about four tokens, 
somewhat more than the predicted zero contribution. In HIGH-T89 the punishment has a strong 
effect on first-mover incentives. In theory HIGH should free ride because if she makes her stand-
alone contribution she will earn 100 + 1050 = 1150, while if she free rides her earnings will be 
850 + 490 = 1340, about 17% higher. However, taking an approximation from Table 6, if LOW 
only contributes 4 tokens when HIGH free-rides, HIGH earns only 850 + 340 = 1190 from free 
riding, only 3% higher. Thus, incentives for the HIGH first-mover to free ride are considerably 
diluted. This may explain why a significant number of HIGH first-movers contributed 15 tokens, 
and average HIGH contributions are almost 8 tokens. Thus, while contributions are lower in 
HIGH-T89 than LOW-T89, the difference is not nearly as large as predicted. 
5. Conclusion 
Our paper reports an experiment where conventional theory (i.e. ignoring social 
preferences) predicts that leader contributions crowd out subsequent contributions. In one set of 
treatments differences in returns from the public good are sufficiently large to dictate that, in 
theory, the agent with the highest returns from the public good supplies the public good 
regardless of move ordering. In the other set of treatments returns from the public good are not 
too different and, theoretically, leaders should cut back on their contributions expecting 
followers to compensate, and thus contributors should prefer to be early, low, contributors rather 
than late, high, contributors.  
Two important theoretical implications of the model are that when returns from the public 
good are not too different i) sequential contributions result in lower overall provision than 
simultaneous contributions, and ii) there is a ‘first-mover advantage’: a contributor will be better 
off making an early commitment to a low contribution than waiting and responding to the 
contributions of early contributors. 
Our results support the argument that simultaneous mechanisms are better than sequential 
mechanisms from the point of view of maximizing aggregate contributions, at least in the full 
information environment studied. Consistent with the model predictions we found that when 
returns from the public good are sufficiently different aggregate contributions are independent of 
  26move structure, but when returns from the public good are not too different aggregate contributions 
are lower when the person with the highest returns from the public good moves first.  
Although we find that early contributions to a public good do crowd-out subsequent 
contributions, this does not occur to the extent predicted by theory. In particular, late contributors 
resist being taken advantage of by early low contributors. Rather than fully compensating low 
initial contributions, they only partially compensate. This induces early contributors to contribute 
more than they otherwise would. One of the implications is that, relative to theoretical predictions, 
contributions are less extreme than predicted. Another implication is that there is not much of an 
advantage to committing to being a free-rider. In fact, we find no first-mover advantage in the 
parameter set where it is predicted, and a first-mover disadvantage in the other parameter set where 
earnings are predicted to be independent of move ordering. 
Our results on the distribution of contributions and move advantage have important 
implications. First, if a fundraiser is choosing between a sequential and simultaneous solicitation 
mechanism the optimal choice may depend on the distribution of contributions as well as the 
level of overall contributions. Although aggregate contributions follow theoretically predicted 
directions, the distribution of contributions does not. When the person with lowest returns from 
the public good moves first aggregate contributions are never lower and the distribution of 
contributions is also more even. Thus, this sequential move ordering may be quite acceptable on 
many normative criteria, and may even be preferred to a simultaneous move structure. Second, in 
some settings the move structure is not exogenously imposed, but rather emerges endogenously, 
and this process typically reflects how alternative move structures reward participants. We find 
that in the case where theoretically lower aggregate contributions are associated with a 
theoretical first-mover advantage, no first move advantage is actually attained. Thus, it is unclear 
whether the detrimental move ordering would emerge in practice. 
  27Appendix A: Experimental Instructions 
Instructions 
General 
Welcome! You are about to take part in an experiment in the economics of decision making. You will be 
paid in private and in cash at the end of the experiment. The amount you earn will depend on your 
decisions, so please follow the instructions carefully. It is important that you do not talk to any of the 
other participants until the experiment is over. If you have a question at any time, raise your hand and a 
monitor will come to your desk to answer it. 
The experiment will consist of fifteen rounds. There are sixteen participants in this room. Before the first 
round begins the computer will randomly assign the role of “RED” to eight participants and the role of 
“BLUE” to eight participants. You will be informed of your role, either RED or BLUE, at the beginning 
of round one and you will keep this role throughout the fifteen rounds. In each round the computer will 
randomly form eight pairs consisting of one RED and one BLUE participant. Thus, you will be randomly 
matched with another person in this room in each round, but this may be a different person from round to 
round. You will not learn who is matched with you in any round, neither during nor after today’s session.  
Each round is identical. In each round you and the person you are matched with will make choices and 
earn points. The point earnings will depend on the choices as we will explain below. At the end of the 
experiment one of the fifteen rounds will be selected at random. Your earnings from the experiment will 
depend on your point earnings in this randomly selected round. These point earnings will be converted 
into cash at a rate of 1p per point. 
How You Earn Points 
At the beginning of the round you will be given an endowment of 17 tokens. You have to decide how 
many of these tokens to place in a Private Account and how many to place in a Shared Account.  
For each token you place in your Private Account you will earn 50 points, as shown in Table 1. 
For each token placed in the Shared Account you will earn an additional amount, regardless of whether 
the token was placed by you or the person you are matched with. Likewise, for each token placed in the 
Shared Account the person you are matched with will earn an additional amount, regardless of whether 
the token was placed by you or them. Earnings from the Shared Account are shown in Table 2. 
Your point earnings for the round will be the sum of your earnings from your Private Account and your 
earnings from the Shared Account. 
  28So that everyone understands how choices translate into point earnings we will give an example and a 
test. Please note that the allocations of tokens used for the example and test are simply for illustrative 
purposes. In the experiment the allocations will depend on the actual choices of the participants. 
[T78 treatments: 
Example: Suppose RED places 9 tokens in his Private Account and 8 tokens in the Shared Account, and 
BLUE places 10 tokens in his Private Account and 7 tokens in the Shared Account. In this example there 
are a total of 15 tokens in the Shared Account. RED will earn 450 points from his Private Account, plus 
1050 points from the Shared Account, for a total of 1500 points. BLUE will earn 500 points from his 
Private Account, plus 620 points from the Shared Account, for a total of 1120 points. ] 
[T89 treatments: 
Example: Suppose RED places 9 tokens in his Private Account and 8 tokens in the Shared Account, and 
BLUE places 10 tokens in his Private Account and 7 tokens in the Shared Account. In this example there 
are a total of 15 tokens in the Shared Account. RED will earn 450 points from his Private Account, plus 
1050 points from the Shared Account, for a total of 1500 points. BLUE will earn 500 points from his 
Private Account, plus 705 points from the Shared Account, for a total of 1205 points.] 
 
Test: Before we continue with the instructions we want to make sure that everyone understands how their 
earnings are determined. Please answer the questions below. Raise your hand if you have a question.  
After a few minutes a monitor will check your answers. When everyone has answered the questions 
correctly we will continue with the instructions. 
Suppose RED allocates 11 tokens to his Private Account and 6 tokens to the Shared Account, and 
BLUE allocates 5 tokens to his Private Account and 12 tokens to the Shared Account. 
1. What will be RED’s point earnings from his private account?      __________ 
2. What will be RED’s point earnings from the shared account?      __________ 
3. What will be RED’s point earnings for the round?         __________ 
4. What will be BLUE’s point earnings from his private account?     __________ 
5. What will be BLUE’s point earnings from the shared account?     __________ 
6. What will be BLUE’s point earnings  for  the  round?     __________ 
How You Make Decisions 
[Sequential treatments: 
At the beginning of a round BLUE will make a decision about how to allocate his or her endowment by 
typing in a number of tokens to place in the Shared Account. BLUE can enter any whole number between 
  290 and 17 inclusive. The computer will then automatically place the remainder of BLUE’s endowment in 
BLUE’s Private Account.  
The computer will then inform RED of BLUE’s decision.  
After RED has seen how many tokens BLUE has allocated to the Shared Account, RED will decide how 
to allocate his or her endowment. RED will do this by typing in a number of tokens to place in the Shared 
Account. RED can enter any whole number between 0 and 17 inclusive. The computer will then 
automatically place the remainder of RED’s endowment in RED’s Private Account.  
After RED has made his or her decision the computer will then show an information screen to both RED 
and BLUE. This screen will display the total number of tokens placed in the Shared Account and the 
earnings of each person for that round.] 
[Simultaneous treatments: 
At the beginning of a round you will make a decision about how to allocate your endowment by typing in 
a number of tokens to place in the Shared Account. You can enter any whole number between 0 and 17 
inclusive. The computer will then automatically place the remainder of your endowment in your Private 
Account.  
At the same time, the person with whom you are matched will be deciding how many tokens to place in 
the Shared Account by entering a number between 0 and 17 inclusive.  
After you and the person you are matched with have both made your decisions the computer will then 
show an information screen to both RED and BLUE. This screen will display the total number of tokens 
placed in the Shared Account and the earnings of each person for that round.] 
After you have read the information screen, you must click on the continue button to go on to the next 
round.  
How Your Cash Earnings Are Determined  
At the end of round fifteen there will be a random draw to select the round for which you will be paid. A 
poker chip will be drawn from a bag containing chips numbered from 1 to 15. The number on the chip 
will determine the round that is used for determining all participants’ cash earnings. Your point earnings 
in this randomly selected round will be converted into cash at a rate of 1p per point. You will be paid in 
private and in cash. 
Beginning the Experiment  
Now, please look at your computer screen and begin making your decisions. If you have a question at any 
time please raise your hand and a monitor will come to your desk to answer it. 
  30Appendix B. Earnings Tables for T78 treatments 
EARNINGS TABLES 
 
Table 1. Earnings from Your Private Account            Table 2. Earnings from the Shared Account 
TOKENS IN YOUR 
PRIVATE ACCOUNT 
YOUR POINT EARNINGS 














          
0 0    0  0  0 
1 50    1  90  55 
2 100    2  180  110 
3 150    3  260  155 
4 200    4  340  200 
5 250    5  415  245 
6 300    6  490  290 
7 350    7  565  330 
8 400    8  635  370 
9 450    9  700  410 
10 500    10  765  450 
11 550    11  825  485 
12 600    12  885  520 
13 650    13  940  555 
14 700    14  995  590 
15  750   15 1050  620 
16  800   16 1095  650 
17  850   17 1140  675 
     18  1180  700 
     19  1220  725 
     20  1260  750 
     21  1295  770 
     22  1330  790 
     23  1360  805 
     24  1385  820 
     25  1410  835 
     26  1435  850 
     27  1455  860 
     28  1470  870 
     29  1485  880 
     30  1500  890 
     31  1510  895 
     32  1515  900 
     33  1520  905 
     34  1525  910 
 
  31  32
Appendix C. Earnings Tables for T89 treatments 
EARNINGS TABLES 
 
Table 1. Earnings from Your Private Account            Table 2. Earnings from the Shared Account 
TOKENS IN YOUR 
PRIVATE ACCOUNT 
YOUR POINT EARNINGS 














          
0 0    0  0  0 
1 50    1  90  60 
2 100    2  180  120 
3 150    3  260  175 
4 200    4  340  230 
5 250    5  415  285 
6 300    6  490  340 
7 350    7  565  385 
8 400    8  635  430 
9 450    9  700  475 
10 500    10  765  520 
11 550    11  825  560 
12 600    12  885  600 
13 650    13  940  635 
14 700    14  995  670 
15  750   15 1050  705 
16  800   16 1095  740 
17  850   17 1140  770 
     18  1180  800 
     19  1220  830 
     20  1260  855 
     21  1295  880 
     22  1330  900 
     23  1360  920 
     24  1385  940 
     25  1410  960 
     26  1435  975 
     27  1455  990 
     28  1470  1000 
     29  1485  1010 
     30  1500  1020 
     31  1510  1025 
     32  1515  1030 
     33  1520  1035 
     34  1525  1040   33
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